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Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9TH CIR. JANUARY 3, 1993).
Introduction
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. ("Sega"), a manufacturer of video entertainment
systems, sued Accolade, Inc. ("Accolade"), a manufacturer of video
entertainment software compatible with Sega's systems, for copyright and
trademark infringement. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California granted Sega's motion for a preliminary injunction
precluding Accolade's use, manufacture and sales of its Genesis HI-compatible
video games. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding Accolade's copying fair use and Sega responsible for any trade-
mark confusion.
Facts
Plaintiff-appellee, Sega, develops and manufactures video entertainment
systems, including the Genesis console and video game cartridges. Defendant-
appellant, Accolade, is a developer and manufacturer of computer software
including video game cartridges, some of which are compatible with the Genesis
console. Sega markets its products in a number of Southeast Asian countries,
including Taiwan. Taiwan does not recognize foreign copyrights and a number of
counterfeiters have managed to exclude the Sega trademark from game programs
in order to manufacture counterfeit cartridges. In order to protect its trademark
rights in the Genesis console and Genesis-compatible games, Sega developed a
trademark security system ("TMSS"). Upon insertion of a game cartridge, the
Sega Genesis I searches for a security code. If the code is correctly located, the
console grants compatibility and displays a Sega trademark. If the code is not
located, access will be denied.
Accolade identified the code through a two-step process and created four
games which were compatible with the Genesis III and displayed the Sega trade-
mark. First, in order to learn the requirements for compatibility, Accolade
employed a "reverse engineering" process. Part of that process involved
disassembly, or transformation of the machine-readable "object code" into
human-readable "source code." From Sega game cartridges, Accolade generated
printouts of the source code. From this source code, Accolade engineers
discovered the requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console and
documented the functional descriptions of those requirements. Second, Accolade
created games for the Genesis. It maintained that it did not copy Sega's game
programs. It only used the information regarding the Genesis interface
specifications.
Sega filed suit for trademark infringement and false designation of origin
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under sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' It also alleged copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act. Accolade counterclaimed for false
designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.2 The district court
granted Sega's motion for a preliminary injunction after finding that the TMSS
code was not functional, thus Accolade had no functionality defense to the trade-
mark infringement claim. Regarding the copyright claim, the district court found
that intermediate copying of the code constitutes infringement and rejected the
fair use defense because Accolade disassembled the code for a commercial
purpose, Sega lost sales and there were alternatives to copying in order to
discover the functional aspects of the program. On appeal, the judgment was
reversed, but the appellate court declined to issue an injunction pendente lite
precluding Sega's further use of its security system.
Legal Analysis
The court of appeals examined the issue whether the Copyright Act preludes
the disassembly of a copyrighted computer program for purposes of gaining
access to functional, unprotected elements of the program. It found disassembly
permissible under the Copyright Act when there is a legitimate reason for dis-
assembling the program and when there are no other means of accessing the
unprotected elements.
Accolade argued that disassembly of the object code does not constitute copy-
right infringement. It claimed that intermediate copying is permissible as long as
the end product is not substantially similar to the copyrighted work. The court
rejected this argument citing Walker v. University Books3 which held that use of
only a portion or smaller version of a copyrighted work does not shield the user
from liability. The court observed that on its face, the language of section 106 of
the Copyright Act proscribes intermediate copying as it grants the copyright
owner exclusive rights "to reproduce the work in copies."4
Accolade also claimed that disassembly in order to gain an understanding of
functional ideas constitutes fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act
which establishes the fair use defense to an otherwise valid copyright
infringement claim.5 The appellate court agreed that disassembly constitutes fair
use when it is the only means of gaining access to unprotected aspects of a
program and there is a legitimate interest in gaining access. Four factors are to
be considered in determining whether a particular use is fair: the purpose and
character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and the effect of the use upon the potential market.6
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (a)(1), 1125(a)(1988).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1988).
3. 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979).
4. 17 U.S.C. §106 (1988).
5. 17 U.S.C. §107(1988).
6. Id.
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The court's analysis of the purpose and character of the use weighed in favor
of a finding of fair use. Accolade copied Sega's software to discover functional
aspects of the program. Any commercial purpose was indirect since the copying
was merely intermediary in developing Accolade's own products. Accolade had
no intention of bypassing its own creativity. Also, despite Accolade's commercial
gain, the court found competition between video game manufacturers and the
dissemination of numerous creative works serves the public interest. The
presumption of unfairness was overcome given the purpose and character of the
use.
The court found that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
also weighed in favor of fair use. It said that many aspects of computer
programs are utilitarian and not protected under the Copyright Act. Adopting the
Second Circuit's approach in Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,7 it found
that when the computer program is broken down into its core functional
elements, many aspects of the program are not protectible. Accolade had a valid
fair use defense in that functional elements cannot be discovered without
translating the code which in turn cannot be done without making copies of the
code. In addition, there was no indication of a viable alternative to copying the
code in order to find the functional elements. Disassembly was necessary to
understand the functional requirements for Genesis compatibility. If disassembly
was per se an unfair use, the owner of copyrighted material would have a
monopoly over the unprotected functional aspects of the material. This was
contrary to the express intent of Congress under the Copyright Act. Thus, the
court found the nature of the copyrighted work was such that copying in order to
access functional elements may constitute fair use.
The third statutory factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, weighed against fair use. Accolade
disassembled the entire copyrighted work. However, the court held that this
factor was not conclusive or dispositive. It found that where the ultimate use is
limited, the fact that the whole design was copied is of little importance.
Finally, the court found the effect of the use upon the potential market was
indicative of fair use. Accolade did not attempt to usurp the market for Genesis-
compatible video games. It wanted to become a legitimate competitor in the
field. The court said Accolade undoubtedly affected the market by releasing its
video games in the market. However, most consumers of video games purchase
more than one game especially if the games are substantially different. Sega's
attempt to limit competition in the market was clearly contrary to the express
purpose of the Copyright Act of promoting creativity and competition. The effect
of Accolade's copying on the market was minor and weighed in favor of fair
use.
The court held that Sega had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits
since three of the four factors weighed in favor of a finding of fair use. The third
factor, substantiality of the portion used compared to the whole copyrighted
7. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 3
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work, only weighed slightly in Sega's favor and was not dispositive. In light of
the important public interest in stimulating artistic creativity, the court found
disassembly of a copyrighted computer program for the purpose of seeking
access to functional concepts fair use and dissolved the preliminary injunction.
The court then considered the issue of whether, on grounds of false display of
trademark, a computer manufacturer may enjoin competing cartridge
manufacturers from obtaining access to its computers through the use of an
initialization code which causes the manufacturer's trademark to appear when
access is gained. Use of the initialization code in Accolade's game cartridges
caused the Sega trademark to appear upon access to the Genesis III. Section
32(l)(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes the reproduction of a registered mark
which is likely to cause confusion among consumers! Section 43(a) prohibits
false designation of the origin of goods where such use is likely to cause
confusion among consumers.9 The court found that when there is no other
readily available means of access to an unpatented system, use of the code is
permissible regardless of the display of the misleading trademark.
Sega and Accolade agreed that use of the initialization code constituted a
misuse of trademark and unlawful mislabeling from which confusion could
result. The disagreement arose as to who was at fault for the confusion. Sega
claimed that use of the code constituted trademark infringement and Accolade
claimed that Sega's use of the TMSS constituted false designation of origin.
The court found Sega liable because the TMSS regulated access to an
unpatented system of functional concepts and there was no indication of an alter-
nate means of discovering those functional concepts. It said that Sega knew the
code would limit competition in that competitors would learn how to use the
code and their video games would end up falsely labeled. Sega should have
foreseen that the code would discourage competitors who wanted to avoid false
labeling.
Sega argued it should not be liable for false labeling because competitors
were not precluded from developing games which did not display the Sega trade-
mark. It contended that Accolade's engineers could have used an alternative
method that did not employ the TMSS. Accolade argued that the TMSS is a
functional feature which is necessary in order for a video game cartridge to
operate on the Genesis III console. The court agreed with Accolade and held that
the initialization was a functional feature and Accolade may lawfully use it.
Factors which aid in determining whether a feature is functional include the
availability of alternative designs, whether the feature is essential to the purpose
of the design and whether the feature affects the cost or quality of the article.
Because there was no evidence of a reasonable alternative means of gaining
access to the Genesis III and because the TMSS code was essential to gaining
access, the court held that Sega failed to establish nonfunctionality and was not
entitled to injunctive relief under the Lanham Act.
8. 15 U.S.C. §1114(I)(a)(1988).
9. 15 U.S.C. §I125(a)(1988).
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Conclusion
Reversing the district court's grant of preliminary injunction, the court
considered four factors as an indication of fair use under the Copyright Act. It
examined the purpose and character of the use, including whether there was a
commercial purpose, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the portion used and the effect of the use upon the potential
market. The court found that Accolade's copying of Sega's copyrighted material
was protected fair use because there was a legitimate reason for disassembling
the program and no other means of accessing the unprotected elements.
As to the trademark claim, the court found that the trademark was misused
where it served to limit competition and that Sega should have been aware of a
likely false labeling effect on its video game competitors. The court also stated
that Sega did not prove nonfunctionality where there was no evidence of a
readily available alternative means of access to an unpatented system. Use of the
code was therefore permissible regardless of the display of a misleading
trademark.
Kathleen Love
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